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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












CITY OF PHILADELPHIA WATER DEPARTMENT 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-cv-01462) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell  
______ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2013 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENBERG and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 7, 2013) 
______ 
 




GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal by plaintiff, Silvia 
Yovtcheva, from an order of the District Court entering summary judgment against her in 
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favor of her former employer, defendant City of Philadelphia Water Department, on June 
29, 2012, in this action under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  As we 
write solely for the parties, we provide only a brief overview of the facts.  
  Yovtcheva began working as a water technology assistant with the Water 
Department‟s Bureau of Laboratory Services (“BLS”) on February 7, 2005.  BLS has two 
different types of laboratories, “organic” and “inorganic.”  In an affidavit BLS Director 
Geoff Brock explained that “[t]he terms „organic‟ and „inorganic‟ do not refer to the kind 
of solvents used in the labs, but, rather, to the kinds of analytes that are the subject of 
various procedures within each lab group.”  App. at 117.  Chemists in both types of 
laboratories use organic solvents.
1
  
  In January 2007, the Water Department promoted Yovtcheva to the position of 
analytical chemist I.  In July 2007, she began working on a project involving gas 
chromatography analysis referred to as EPA Method 551.1.  In early 2008, she informed 
her supervisor, Earl Peterkin, that she was having health problems in the laboratory as a 
result of her work with methyl tertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”).  At a later meeting, she 
informed Brock of the situation.  At Brock‟s behest, the office‟s safety committee 
conducted a safety audit.  Though the committee did not find any problems, the Water 
Department offered Yovtcheva the option of wearing a full-face respirator for protection 
while working.  She was fitted with the respirator in July 2008 but only used it a few 
                                              
1
 During Yovtcheva‟s tenure, the BLS did not use the organic solvent methyl tertiary 
butyl ether (“MTBE”) in the inorganic laboratories.  The BLS, however, did not rule out 
the possibility that it would use MTBE in the future in the inorganic laboratories. 
3 
 
times because its use made her claustrophobic and caused her to suffer a panic attack.  
The Water Department then offered her a partial-face respirator, but she refused to try it.  
  In view of the problems she was facing, Yovtcheva sought transfers to other 
laboratories within the BLS or elsewhere within the Water Department but the Water 
Department did not make the transfer that she requested as it believed that there was no 
suitable position available for that purpose.
2
  On August 29, 2008, Peterkin gave 
Yovtcheva an unsatisfactory annual performance report due to her failure to conduct her 
work assignment.  Though he recognized that she claimed “that a solvent-like „odor‟ 
related to the project was making [her] sick,” he pointed out that her “[w]ork-related 
sickness [had] not been validated.”  Id. at 453.  Yovtcheva and her union representatives 
discussed the evaluation with the administrator of the organic laboratory.  She later left 
work and was designated AWOL.  The Water Department subsequently terminated her 
employment on September 12, 2008, by reason of her absences.
3
  She filed a grievance 
challenging her termination and was reinstated on November 21, 2008.   
          In the absence of any changes to her job assignment after her reinstatement she 
went out on sick leave.  On November 25, 2008, Yovtcheva filed a request for an 
                                              
2
 In a sense this point is immaterial because even though the transfer could have been an 
accommodation under the ADA, as we explain below the Water Department offered 
Yovtcheva a different reasonable accommodation. 
 
3
 Dr. Alla Shipaner, Yovtcheva‟s personal physician, prepared a letter dated September 
11, 2008, that was provided to the Water Department, explaining that Yovtcheva had a 
“history of asthma and allergy to chemicals.  She has a history of developing rush [sic], 
frequent headaches and fatigue when exposed to chemical substance MTBE at work.”  





accommodation under the ADA supported by an accompanying medical note from a 
reviewing doctor.
4
  On December 5, 2008, the Water Department‟s Human Resources 
(“HR”) office sent a letter to Yovtcheva denying her request for an accommodation and 
informing her that she would be recorded as being on sick leave.  On December 18, 2008, 
a union representative sent a written request to HR for an in-person meeting to discuss 
Yovtcheva‟s ADA accommodation request.  HR responded via email by asking that 
Yovtcheva first submit a written request for a reasonable accommodation.  After HR did 
not receive a reply, it followed up with a letter to the union representative on February 
11, 2009, in advance of the February 19, 2009 expiration of Yovtcheva‟s Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave, asking for Yovtcheva to set forth the 
accommodation that she sought.  Yovtcheva did not respond, and she was terminated 
following the expiration of her FMLA leave because of her failure to return to work.  
  As the foregoing events were unfolding, Yovtcheva filed a state administrative 
claim for workers‟ compensation benefits that resulted in a workers‟ compensation judge 
making an award to her on February 17, 2010, for disability benefits as of September 5, 
2008.  The workers‟ compensation judge based the award on her findings that Yovtcheva 
“suffered dizziness and trouble breathing as a result of her exposure to MTBE in the 
workplace.”  Id. at 405.   
                                              
4
 On January 1, 2009, non-retroactive ADA amendments took effect.  The primary events 
in question took place prior to 2009, and Yovtcheva does not argue that the ADA 




  On April 1, 2010, Yovtcheva brought this action against the Water Department in 
the District Court under the ADA making claims that she had suffered disability 
discrimination and that the Water Department retaliated against her for seeking an 
accommodation for her disability.  The case failed in that Court when the Water 
Department obtained the summary judgment from which she now appeals.  In its opinion 
the Court held that the Water Department offered Yovtcheva a reasonable 
accommodation by the use of the partial-face respirator but that she refused to try it.  
Moreover, the Court rejected her claim for retaliation predicated on her charge that the 
Water Department discharged her for requesting an accommodation.  In making its ruling 
the Court refused to give preclusive effect to the findings of the workers‟ compensation 
judge. 
  On appeal, Yovtcheva argues that the respirator was only one of three possible 
accommodations that the Water Department could have made for her.  Thus, she points to 
the possibility (1) that the Water Department could have transferred her to a different 
laboratory or (2) could have replaced MTBE with Pentane, another chemical, for its 
testing processes.  Based in part on those options, she advances three arguments on this 
appeal.
5
   
I. The District Court improperly held that the findings of the workers‟ 
compensation judge did not have preclusive effect in the District Court. 
 
                                              
5
 In response to the Water Department‟s motion for summary judgment, Yovtcheva 
withdrew Title VII claims that she made in her complaint and did not advance claims 
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act that she had contemplated making.  
Appellee‟s br. at 3 n.2.    
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II. The District Court erred in awarding summary judgment on her failure to 
accommodate claim under the ADA. 
 
III. The District Court erred in awarding summary judgment on her retaliation 
claim under the ADA.  
 
 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review on this appeal, 
applying the same standard as the District Court.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 
F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).   When considering a motion for summary judgment, we 
“must draw all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party.”  Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citation omitted).  Therefore, we will affirm an order for summary judgment only 
if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).     
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 A. Failure to Accommodate    
  We begin by addressing the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to the 
Water Department on Yovtcheva‟s failure to accommodate claim under the ADA.  We 
have held that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
ADA, he must show: „“(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he 
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is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without 
reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise 
adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”‟  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. 
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).  We explained that 
“[d]iscrimination under the ADA . . . includes failing to make reasonable 
accommodations for a plaintiff‟s disabilities.”  Id.  Therefore, an employer discriminates 
when it “does not „mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of the individual unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the 
[employer].‟”  Id.  (alterations in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  
  There is no dispute that Yovtcheva meets the first prong of the showing necessary 
to survive a motion for summary judgment inasmuch as the Water Department concedes 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she is disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA because she suffers from asthma.  Accordingly, we turn to the issue 
of whether the Water Department offered her a reasonable accommodation for her 
disability.  The parties dispute the specific cause of the problem Yovtcheva was facing 
with Yovtcheva alleging that MTBE was the only chemical that caused her a problem and 
the Water Department claiming that all organic solvents are off limits to her.  In some 
cases a dispute of this kind could be critical as it could be significant in determining the 
accommodation necessary for an employee.  But here we need not linger on the dispute 
for given the conflicting evidence from the assorted medical personnel who examined 
Yovtcheva and the need to view the evidence in the light most favorable to her, we accept 
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as a fact for purposes of this appeal that MTBE was the sole chemical that caused her 
problem.   
  Our acceptance of her claim that MTBE was the specific cause of her problem is 
significant because it demonstrates that she may have been able to work in a laboratory 
that did not employ MTBE even though there were other organic solvents used in that 
laboratory.  Nevertheless, we do not need to discuss either the possibility that she could 
have been reasonably accommodated by a transfer within the Water Department or her 
other post-hoc proposal that the Water Department could have replaced MTBE with the 
organic solvent Pentane, because the uncontroverted record reveals that the Water 
Department offered her a reasonable accommodation by use of a partial-face respirator 
but that she refused to attempt to use such a respirator. 
  As discussed above, the Water Department fitted Yovtcheva for a full-face 
respirator that would have protected her from any exposure to MTBE.  Yovtcheva, 
however, testified in her deposition that she only used the respirator “[a] couple of times. 
. . not more than six or seven times” before stopping because she had one panic attack 
while wearing it.  App. at 207-08.  Furthermore, Yovtcheva did not take advantage of a 
City of Philadelphia employee assistance program available to her which could have 
provided her with counseling and treatment for claustrophobia and panic attacks.  
Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage, we will assume that the Water Department, 
though offering Yovtcheva the use of a full-face respirator, did not offer her a reasonable 
accommodation by that offer for the purposes of her ADA claim.   
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  Even though on this appeal we do not regard the Water Department‟s offer to 
Yovtcheva to make a full-face respirator available to her as a reasonable accommodation, 
we agree with the District Court that Yovtcheva is not a “qualified individual” under the 
ADA because she refused to try the partial-face respirator made available to her.  In this 
regard 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) provides that: 
An individual with a disability is not required to accept an accommodation, 
aid, service, opportunity or benefit which such qualified individual chooses 
not to accept.  However, if such individual rejects a reasonable 
accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit that is necessary to 
enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the position held 
or desired, and cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform the essential 
functions of the position, the individual will not be considered qualified.   
 
  Like the District Court, we also take note of the following exchange from 
Yovtcheva‟s deposition: 
  Q: You were offered a partial facial respirator; isn‟t that true? 
  A: Yes. 
  Q: Did you try that? 
  A: No. 
  Q: Why not? 
  A: Because of the panic attacks. 
  Q. So you didn‟t even try it? 
  A. No. 
 
App. at 208.  The record in this case requires us to hold that the Water Department made 
an offer of a reasonable accommodation when it offered to supply Yovtcheva with a 
partial-face respirator for the purpose of protecting her from the effects of MTBE.  In 
reaching this conclusion we point out that Yovtcheva only suffered a panic attack when 
using a full-face respirator.  Furthermore, the District Court pointed out that there was 
expert testimony in the record that the use of either “a half or full-face respirator would 
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completely preclude the detection of any solvent odor.”  App. at 12.  This testimony was 
undisputed for, as the District Court noted, Yovtcheva pointed “to no record evidence 
that creates a genuine dispute as to the effectiveness of the respirators in allowing her to 
avoid any exposure to the smell of MTBE or other organic solvents.”  Id. at 13.   
  In the circumstances, it is clear that even though not covering the entire face, a 
partial-face respirator could have alleviated Yovtcheva‟s claustrophobia problems while 
protecting her from the effects of exposure to any organic solvents.
6
  Contrary to 
Yovtcheva‟s assertion, “[a]n employer is not obligated to provide an employee the 
accommodation he requests or prefers, the employer need only provide some reasonable 
accommodation.”  Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted); see also Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“[A] reasonable accommodation generally does not require an employer to reassign a 
disabled employee to a different position.”).           
 B. Preclusion 
  We do not determine the preclusive effect of the findings in the workers‟ 
compensation proceeding because there is no factual dispute regarding Yovtcheva‟s 
refusal to attempt the use of a partial-face respirator and that refusal required the District 
Court to grant summary judgment against her.  Nonetheless, we take note of the District 
Court‟s ruling that the workers‟ compensation judge‟s findings did not have a preclusive 
                                              
6
 The “reasonable accommodation” requirement „“includes the employer‟s reasonable 
efforts to assist the employee and to communicate with the employee in good faith.”‟  
Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep‟t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 416 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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effect in the proceedings in the District Court and its alternative holding, with which we 
agree, that even if the workers‟ compensation findings in some circumstances could have 
a preclusive effect in a district court, in this case the workers‟ compensation judge‟s 
narrow focus on whether Yovtcheva was entitled to benefits did not address the issue of 
accommodation.   
  Yovtcheva cites Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2000), for the 
proposition that a workers‟ compensation judge‟s factual findings may be given 
preclusive effect in subsequent ADA proceedings.  Appellant‟s br. at 31.7  The Water 
Department counters that the workers‟ compensation judge‟s findings were not reviewed 
by the state courts and contends that administrative rulings that are not reviewed by state 
courts are not entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent ADA proceedings.  Appellee‟s 
br. at 32 (citing, inter alia, Pernice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 787 n.5 (7th Cir. 
2001); Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 39 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998)).  
Our precedent does not clearly resolve the question of whether judicially unreviewed 
administrative findings can be given preclusive effect in subsequent judicial proceedings 
for, as the Water Department points out, in Jones, the case to which Yovtcheva points, 
the Pennsylvania state courts reviewed the workers‟ compensation judge‟s findings.    
  We recognize that “administrative estoppel is favored as a matter of general 
policy.”  Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‟n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 
2170 (1991).  But “its suitability may vary according to the specific context of the rights 
at stake, the power of the agency, and the relative adequacy of agency procedures.”  Id. at 
                                              
7
 She also cites a not precedential opinion of this Court for the same proposition.  
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110, 111 S.Ct. at 2170.  For example, as we noted in Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 
243, 259 (3d Cir. 2005), in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 
3220 (1986), the Supreme Court “prohibit[ed] the use of collateral estoppel to give an 
unreviewed state administrative determination preclusive effect in a Title VII action.”  In 
Astoria, the Supreme Court extended the Elliott holding to ADEA actions.  In Pernice v. 
City of Chicago, 237 F.3d at 787 n.5, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
applied the Elliott principle to claims under Title I of the ADA.
8
  The Pernice court 
explained that in Elliott, “the Supreme Court held that a provision in Title VII directing 
the EEOC to give „substantial weight‟ to the findings of state administrative bodies, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), indicated Congress‟ intent that common law issue preclusion not 
apply to the findings of such bodies.”  Id.  Given that “Title I of the ADA incorporates 
the same deferral procedures, 42 U.S.C. § 12117, Elliott‟s reasoning applies equally to 
ADA cases.”  Id. (citing Thomas, 150 F.3d at 39 & n.5).   
 C. Retaliation          
  Yovtcheva also challenges the District Court‟s award of summary judgment 
against her on her ADA retaliation claim.  In order for her to establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation under the ADA, Yovtcheva must show: “(1) [that she engaged in] protected 
employee activity; (2) [there was an] adverse action by the employer either after or 
contemporaneous with the employee‟s protected activity; and (3) [that there was] a causal 
connection between the employee‟s protected activity and the employer‟s adverse 
                                              
8
 Yovtcheva‟s claim falls under Title I of the ADA, which deals with issues of 
employment.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. 
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action.”  Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations 
omitted).  We agree with the District Court that Yovtcheva made a showing satisfying the 
first two prongs of the test but failed to satisfy the third prong.   
  Yovtcheva satisfied the first element when she filed an ADA accommodation 
request on November 25, 2008, with an accompanying medical note from a reviewing 
doctor.  The second element was satisfied when the Water Department terminated her 
employment on February 19, 2009, following the expiration of her FMLA leave.  But 
Yovtcheva failed to demonstrate that there was a causal connection between the two 
actions.  Nearly three months passed between the two events, and we have explained that 
„“the timing of the alleged retaliatory action must be „unusually suggestive‟ of retaliatory 
motive before a causal link will be inferred.”‟  Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 
318 F.3d 183, 189 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Williams v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep‟t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding a span of two 
months insufficiently indicative of a causal link in the absence of supporting evidence).
9
  
Yovtcheva attempts to overcome the tenuous temporal proximity between the events in 
this case by claiming that the Water Department was antagonistic toward her.  See 
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff can 
establish a link between his or her protected behavior and subsequent discharge if the 
                                              
9
 We do not doubt that in theory a disabled employee might be able to establish that there 
was a casual connection between her protected activity and subsequent adverse 
employment action that the employer took many months or perhaps even years later.  
There might be such a case if the employee had direct proof linking the events such as a 
letter from the employer indicating that it was taking the adverse employment action 
because the employee had engaged in protected activity at the earlier time.  In this case, 
however, Yovtcheva has not advanced any such evidence. 
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employer engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.”) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted).  She specifically points to the February 11, 2009 letter in 
which HR followed up with Yovtcheva‟s union representative in advance of the 
impending expiration of her FMLA leave.  This letter followed the December exchanges 
between HR and the representative regarding Yovtcheva‟s status.   
  Yovtcheva‟s formal ADA accommodation request described the following 
reasonable accommodations as necessary:  “Avoid any type of work where she would 
have exposure to organic solvents.  Transfer to another line of work.  Avoidance of 
irritants.”  App. at 348.  Based on a review of the job specifications for Yovtcheva‟s 
employment classification, HR informed Yovtcheva on December 5, 2008, that the Water 
Department was denying the accommodation request.  Yet HR concluded its letter by 
noting that “the Water Department remain[ed] willing to consider any request 
[Yovtcheva] might make for a reasonable accommodation of a qualifying disability.”  
App. at 351.  In response, the representative submitted a written request for a meeting on 
December 18, 2008, because she “believe[d] that there [were] approaches that could be 
tried which would meet [Yovtcheva‟s] medical restrictions and still meet the 
department‟s operational needs.”  App. at 352.  In the absence of any specifics, HR 
replied via email letter on December 29, 2008, reiterating that Yovtcheva should submit a 
written request for a reasonable accommodation.  Yovtcheva, however, did not respond 
to the email but HR nevertheless followed up with another letter on February 11, 2009, in 
advance of the expiration of Yovtcheva‟s FMLA leave again seeking to have Yovtcheva 
file the request for the accommodation.   
15 
 
  The foregoing February correspondence forms the basis of Yovtcheva‟s retaliation 
claim.  Yet HR‟s letter hardly is indicative of an antagonistic attitude; rather, HR took it 
upon itself to remind Yovtcheva of her employer‟s “willing[ness] to consider any request 
[she] might make for a reasonable accommodation of a qualifying disability.”  App. at 
473.  Contrary to what Yovtcheva indicates in her brief, no reasonable jury could find 
that HR was actually “feigning lack of knowledge of Plaintiff‟s condition and of her 
requested accommodation” in an attempt to antagonize her regarding her situation.  
Appellant‟s br. at 34.  The Water Department was offering Yovtcheva a final chance to 
respond prior to her termination at the expiration of her FMLA leave.  In the 
circumstances, Yovtcheva failed to make out a prima facie retaliation claim and thus the 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment against her on that claim.
10
 
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
  For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court‟s order for 
summary judgment of June 29, 2012.    
______ 
 
                                              
10
 The District Court also granted summary judgment on the grounds that Yovtcheva 
could not “show that the City‟s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual.”  
App. at 18.   
